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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment concerning the status

defend<~

of a judgment lien which existed prior to the date that
Leoda Dunham

lwho is the judgment debtor)

I

declared her interest:

in the subject real estate to be her home stead,

and prior to

the date that said defendant Leoda Di.mham conveyed her interest[
in the homestead property, reserving a life estate,

to

responde:~

I

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On August 1, 1977, a hearing before the court below was
held relative to respondents' Motion For Judgment On The Plead1:j
Or For SUI!Uilary Judgment, and relative to appellant'-s cross-rnotiq
for Judgment On The Pleadings Or For Surmnary Judgment.
response thereto,

In

the court below rendered it's judgment

adjuding that the conveyance of property subj ec t

to a home stead,

I
I

with the reservation of a life estate in defendant Leoda
Dunham (gran tor) , did not re serve the home stead in the said
granter, but that such homestead was conveyed to the grantees,
respondents herein,

and that the value of the conveyed interest

at that time was less than that of the homestead interest.
On that basis,

the court granted respondents' Motion For Judgmer:

On The Pleadings and denied appellant's motion.

The judgment

was entered on September 6, 1977, and appellant made 11is Motion
To Reconsider And To Amend Findings Of Fact within ten days
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thereafter.
On October 3rd, 1977,

the court :1eard appellant's Motion

To Reconsider And To Arrend Findings Of Fact.

Thereafter, the

court rendered its order denying appellant's motion, which
order was entered on October 17th, 1977.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a ruling by this court to the effect that
appellant's prior judgment lien was superior to defendant Leoda
Dunham's subsequent homestead claim, and that,

consequently,

the interest acquired by repondents from defendant Leoda Dunham,
even if it included defendant Leoda Dunham's homestead, was
subject to appellant 1 s prior judgment lien; or
In the alternative,

appellant seeks a ruling by this

court that defendant Leoda Dunham did not convey her homestead
to repondents, and that,

consequently, the interest acquired

by respondents was subject to appellant's prior judgment lien;
or
In the event this court affirms part of the judgment of
the lower court by not reversing the lower court' s judgment
so as to conform with the legal propositions of the immediately
preceeding two paragraphs,

then appellant seeks a ruling re-

quiring the lower court to determine at trial the value of the
real estate interest conveyed to respondents by defendant
Leoda Dunham;

and
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Appellant seeks an order from this court authorizing and
requiring the oourt below to amend it's Findings of Fact to
include all the allegations in the parties' pleadings which we
adroi tted; and
Appellant seeks an order from this court authorizing and
requiring the oourt below to amend it's Findings of Fact to ini
porate the changes set forth in paragraphs four and five of
appellant's Statement of Points Relied On.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(Reference to appellant's Counterclaim, which is a part o

appellant's Answer To Amended Complaint, Counterclaim And Cros:
complaint, is hereinafter referred to as "CC"; reference to
respondents'

Reply to appellant's counterclaim is hereinafter

referred to as "R") .
On or about the 17th day of May, 1971, appellant obtained
a judgment against the defendant Leoda Dunham in the
principal sum of $11,549.43,

together with costs of suit.

lRespondents' Amended Complaint, First Cause of Action,

para.

S; appellant's Answer To Am::!nded Complaint, Counterclaim, And
Cross-complaint, Second Defense, para 1. J
On or about the 1st day of August, 1972, appellant caused
to be issued out of the office of the clerk of Summit County,
an execution, whereby and wherein the sheriff of Summit county

was directed to execute and levy upon the property of defendant
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Leoda Dunham.

Thereafter,

the Sheriff of Sununit County

caused to be posted a Notice of Sale, whereby and where in the
property that is the subject r:ia.tter of this action was noticed
for sale at the county courthouse in Summit County, State of
Utah, on the 13th day of September, 1972 at the hour of 1: 00
p.m.

(CC, para 5; R, para.

LA.).

The Sheriff's Sale did

not occur.
On

or ab~~\e.1J1e 10th day of September, 1972, defendant

Leoda Dunham

~

a Declaration of Honestead asserting

a homestead claim and exemption in the amount of $4,600.00
for herself and her brother, and asserting that the value of
the real estate subject to the homestead declaration, which is
the subject property in this matter, was $3,600.00.

Said

Declaration of Homestead was recorded on the 11th day of
September,
CCC para.

1972, in the office of the Summit County Recorder.
6; R, para.

l.A.; and Declaration of Homestead

attached to respondents' Amended Complaint.)
On or about the 29th day of November, 1972, the defendant
Leoda Dunham, as granter,

conveyed by quit-claim deed

to respondents the subject property, reserving to herself
a life estate representing her homestead claim to the property.
(CC, para.

7; R, para.

LA.)

Respondents, in consideration of the conveyance to
them of cefendant Leoda Dunham's remainder interest, agreed to
pay off cefendant Leoda Dunham's mortgage against the property
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in the approximate amount of $2,000.00, and to acquire the
appellant's interest.

Appellant's interest in the property

was a judgment, plus interest thereon,
amount of $13,000.00.
Affidavit which

in the total approximate

(See Agreement attached to either respon,

l

were submitted with respondents Motion For Jua1

rrent On The Pleadings Or For Summary Judgment.)
Respondents took the subject property knowing that appella)
I

had an unsatisfied judgment against defendant Leoda Dunham.
(CC, para.

8;

R, para.

l.A.)

On or about the 11th day of November,

1976, appellant

caused to be issued through the office of the clerk of
Summit County, an execution, whereby and wherein the sheriff
of Summit County was commanded to execute and levy upon the
unexempt personal and real property of the defendant Leoda
Dunham, in an amount sufficient to satisfy the

judgment

dated May 17th, 1971, together with accrued interest thereon.
(_CC, para.

9; R, para. l.A.)

Instructions in the form of a Praecipe were issued to
the sheriff of Summit County to sell an undivided one-half
interest in the subject property.

CCC, para.

10;

R, para. 1.A .. I

The Execution and Praecipe were served upon the re_spondent:
by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office.

(CC, para.

11; R, panl

l.A.)
A sheriff's sale was held on December 7th, 1976, whereat the appellant bid in the entire amount of his judgment for
the subject property believing that he was purchasing the
interest of defendant Leoda Dunham and that of respondents.
(_CC, para.

13; R, para. 1. C.)
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On or about the 21st day of April, 197"/, respondents filed
suit against appellant and others, seeking declaratory relief
and a judgrrent quieting title in the sub]ect property in them.
It is out of this suit that this matter cones before this court.
(Respondents' complaint).

ARGUMENT
I

APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT LEODA
DUNHAM CREATED A LIEN ON THE IAND OF DEFENDANT
LEODA ruNHAM WHICH WAS PRIOR 'ID AND SUPERIOR
TO THE HOMESTEAD CLAIM OF DEFENDANT LEODA
DUNHAM AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE ACQUISITION OF
THE HOMESTEAD INTEREST BY RESPONDENTS FROM
DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM, IF SUCH OCCURRED, DID
NOT RESULT IN THE ACQUISITION OF AN INTEREST
IN THE PROPERTY FREE FROM THE JUDGMENT LIEN.
A judgment lien on real estate, obtained before a homestead
is established thereon,
by, the homestead claim.

is superior to, and not extinguished
Consequently, where a homestead

declarant conveys real estate together with a homestead, where
such homestead is subordinate to a judgment lien, the transferee
receives the realty subject to the judgment lien, and that
lien may be foreclosed against the property regardless of the
fact that the homestead claimant may have transferred his homestead interest to the transferee.
u.c.A. 28-1-1 provides that a home?tead "shall be exempt
from judgment lien and from execution or forced sale" except
upon certain conditions.
instant case.

None of the o::mditions apply to the

Though this section has been amended to increase

the exempt amounts and to add a condition, it's language is
otherwise identical to the original provision as enacted in
1898.

(See "History" and "Compilers Notes" regarding U.C.A
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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28-1-11.
U.C.A. 28-1-1 precludes execution and forced sale pursuant
to a Judgment lien only when a homestead exists at the time a
judgment lien would otherwise attach to the property.

McMurdie,

i

vs • Chugg , 10 7 P. 2 d 16 3

(Ytah 1940}; and U.C.A.

78-23-3.

In

McMurdie the court reaffirmed a position it had taken previous!
with the following language :
"Existing liens on property cannot be defeated
by subsequently claiming said property as a Homestead." Page 166.
U.C.A.

78-23-3 provides:

"No article or species of property rrentioned in
this chapter or in the title Homestead is exempt
from execution issued upon a judgment .•• on foreclosure of a mortgage or other val id lien ..• "
(Emphasis added.)
A judgment creates a lien on the judgment debtor's realty
under the provisions of U.C.A.

78-22-1.

A judgment lien

cannot attach to homestead property unless otherwise provided
in U.C.A. 28-1-1.

Thus,

unless otherwise provided in

u.c.A.

28-1-1, a judgment lien can be a "valid lien'' on a judgment
debtor's real estate only if the real estate is not homestead
property at the time the judgment is entered.

Therefore,

judgment docketed before a homestead is declared,

a

creating a

judgment lien which is a valid lien under the provisions of
U.C.A. 78-23-3, is not affected by· a subsequent homestead
declaration.

Thus, McMurdie and U.C.A.

78-23-3 demonstrate thac

-10-
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I

the past .r_:osition of this court, and of the legislature,

is that

a Judgment lien attaching to realty before a home stead exists
thereon does not lose any of it's force and effect upon the
subsequent establishment of a homestead.

Also,

noted that Utah is not alone in this position.
Co. vs. Smith, 144 P.2d 47

it should be
Schuler-Knox

LCalif. 1944).

Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of
the instant case mandates the conclusion that the respondents
are in no position to successfully maintain that the homestead
of defendant I..eoda Dunham in any way affected the appellant's
judgment lien, nor are they in a position to successfully claim
that the sheriff's sale of the subject property did not transfer
respondents' entire interest in the subject property to the
purchaser, subject to rights of redemption.

The pertinent

facts are as follows:
Appellant obtained a judgment against defendant Leoda
Dunham in May, 1971.

Proceedings for a sheriff's sale of

defendant Leoda Dunham's property, which is the property in
question here, were begun on or about August 1, 1972, but
the sale was not consummated.
On September 10th, 1972, defendant
,,gn<0
Leoda Dunham fi.J,ed a <Eclaration claiming her interests in the
subject property to be a homestead.

Thereafter, on or about

November 29th, 1972, defendant Leoda Dunham conveyed the subject
property to respondents, reserving a life estate in herself.

-11-
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On or about November llth, 1976, appellant began sheriff
sale proceedings which culminated December 7th, 1976, in a
sheriff's sale of defendant Leoda Dunham's life estate and
of respondents'

remainder interest.

Respondents thereafter

in this action contested appellant's claim that their interest

1

in the subject property had been sold at the sheriff's sale.

The appellant's judgment of May 17th, 1971, became a lien
upon the realty of defendant Leoda Dunham which was not
by her later homestead declaration.

extingu1i

Defendant Leoda Dunham's

conveyance of the remainder interest to respondents carried
with it the judgment lien irrespective of whether defendant
Leoda Dunham retained her homestead by reserving a life estate,.
or transferred it to the respondents with the remainder
interest.

Thus, the sheriff's sale was sufficient to foreclose

the lien against respondents'

I

interest in the property, and

the sheriff sale purchaser, being the appellant herein,
obtained title to the realty, subject to any rights of redemptu
Consequently, respondents'

claim that their interest in the

subject realty was not sold, or was improperly sold at the
sheriff's sale is unfounded.

-12-
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II

THE CONVEYANCE FROM DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM TO
RESPONDENTS, WHEREIN DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM
RETAINED A LIFE ESTATE, DID NOT CONVEY DEFENDANT
LEODA DUNHAM'S HOMESTEAD IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
TO RESPONDENTS.
In the event this court for any reason does not hold
that appellant's prior judgment lien was superior to defendant
Leoda Dunham's homestead claim, such that respondents took
a remainder interest from defendant Leoda Dlll"l.ham subject to
it,

then appellant submits the following argument.
Other than the pleadings filed by the parties in this

matter,

there was little evidence brought before the court

below upon which it could base it's ruling in this matter.
Appellant alleged in paragraph 7 of it's counterclaim that the
act of defendant Leoda Dunham in reserving a life estate in
the subject property was an act whereby she retained her homestead.

Respondents admitted that this was the case in their

Reply to Appellant's counterclaim.
Respondents Reply.
the court below,

See paragraph 1. A. of

Though this admission was pointed out to

the court ignored it.

Further, respondents

have never attempted to amend their Reply.
by itself,

This admission,

should have precluded the court below from rendering

·a judgment on the pleadings, and in any case, i t should prohibit
the respondents herein from taking a position contrary to this
admission.
-13-
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Aside from respondents'

admission,

it is evident that

defendant Leoda Dunham did not convey her homestead in the
subject property.
In analyzing the facts from a position which rrost favors
appellant, Frederick May

&

Company v. Dunn,

368 P.2d 266

(!Jtah 1962 l, one rrust assume that defendant Leoda Dunham
acted rationally in conveying her interests in the subject
property to respondents.

This assumption leads directly to

the conclusion that defendant Leoda Dunham did not convey
her homestead to respondents with the a:mveyance of the
remainder interest in the property.

This conclusion becomes

very apparent upon analyzing the facts of this case.
The pertinent facts are that defendant Leoda Dunham stated
in her homestead declaration that the value of the property
was $3,600.00

(which amount appellant disputes), and that

she was entitled to a $4,600.00 exemption.
three rronths later she sold her interest,
estate, for the respondents'

Approximately
reserving a life

promises that they would pay off

a $2,000.00 rrortgage and "acquire" appellant's interest in
defendant Leoda Dunham's property.

(See Agreement attached to
I

either respondents' Affidavit which was submitted with responden;
Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or For Summary Judgment,

-14-
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and Defendant's Exhibit No. 1.)

Assuming that the value

of defendant Leoda Dunham's undivided one-half interest
was $3, 600. 00 as claimed, and that the full value was protected
by a homestead claim in the amount of $4, 600. 00, the following
results could have been obtained:
Situation

Result to defendant Leoda Dunham

1. Defendant Leoda Dunham
retained her entire interest
instead of conveying a remainder
interest therein to respondents.

Defendant Leoda Dunham v,10uld
have an equity interest of
~1,600.00 free and clear over
the $2,000.00 mortgage.

2.
Defendant Leoda Dunham conveyed a remainder interest in the
subject property to respondents
together with her homestead
and reserved a life estate.
Respondents were to pay the rrortgage.
(This is respondents' position herein.)

Defendant Leoda Dunham would
be free of the ~2, 000. 00
mortgage , but she would have an
unprotected life estate which
could be taken from her upon
foreclosure of the judgment
lien.

3.
Defendant Leoda Dunham
conveyed a remainder interest
in the subject property to
respondents, reserving a life
estate.
The reserved life estate
carried the homestead.
Respondents agreed to pay off the
$2,000.00 mortgage.
(This is
appellant's position.)

Defendant Leoda Dunham would be
free of the $2,000.00 mortgage
and she would have a protected
life estate.

Clearly, defendant Leoda Dunham would have chosen situation
No.

3 over situation No.

2.

In addition to the assumption that defendant Leoda Dunham
acted rationally in conveying a remainder interest in her undivided one-half of the subject property, the fact that

-15-
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defendant Leoda Dunham reserved to herself a life estate
is conclusive evidence that she retained the homestead.
The assertion that a life estate may support a

~omesteaa

has not been contested by respondents, nor should it be.
See Arighi vs.

Rule

&

Sons,

107 P.2d 970

(Cal. 1940).

The

obvious intent of defendant Leoda Dunham in retaining a life
estate was to assure her a place to live for the rest of her
life.

Such assurance would certainly be lost had she conveyed

1

her homestead because her life estate would then be subject
to appellant's judgment.
In addition to the foregoing, which demonstrates from
a factual standpoint that defendant Leoda Dunham did not convey
her homestead,

this court should hold as a matter of law

that the reservation of any interest in homestead property
which is capable of supporting a homestead, amounts to a
reservation of the homestead unless the deed of conveyanc.e
specifically provides that the homestead is to be conveyed.
Such a holding would follow the California rule as expressed
in Arighi relative to the abandonment of a homestead.
Further, it would meet the liberal construction requirement
of In re Mower's estate,

73 P .2d 967

lUtah 1939), by

preventing a homestead claimant from unwittingly subjecting
a retained interest to creditors' claims.

Also,

it would aid

judgment creditors in that they would not be forced to guess
or begin lawsuits to determine what property is subject to the!'.
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claims.

Thus,

the public welfare could be served by establishing

a precedent which requires a homestead claimant to specifically
convey a homestead interest where such claimant retains an
interest in the property sufficient to support a homestead.

III

THE Q)URT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD THAT THE VALUE
OF THE INTEREST CONVEYED 'ID RESPONDENTS BY
DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM WAS LESS THAN THE
VALUE OF DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM'S HOMESTEAD WHEN
SUCH VALUE WAS IN QUESTION AND CONSTITUTED A
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT.
In the event this court for any reason upholds the
lower court's ruling that respondents received the homestead
interest of defendant Leoda Dunham free and clear of appellant's
judgment lien, then appellant submits the following argument.
Though the judgment appealed from is designated "Judgment
On The Pleadings", it is nore correctly a Sununary Judgment in
that the court did not exclude the respondents' affidavits which
were submitted with respondents' Motion For Judgment On The
Pleadings Or For Surrunary Judgment.

Rule 12(c), U.R.C.P.

In In re Williams Estate, 348 P.2d 683

(_Utah 1960),

the court said the following regarding the propriety of summary
judgment:

-17-
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"Summary Judgment is proper only if the
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
admissions show that there is no genuine
issue of ffi3.terial fact and that the noving
party is entitled to a Judgment as a natter
of law •••. " Page 685.
(Emphasis added. )
Also,

in~,

supra., the court gave additional

guidance as follows:
"
To sustain a sumrnary judgment, the
pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences
therefrom, viewed m::ist favorably to the loser,
must show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and that the winner is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
Such showing
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable
p:>ssibility that the loser could win if given a
trial".
Page 268.
(Emphasis added.)
Further, in Singleton vs. Alexander,

431 P.2d 126

lUtah

19.67) , the court said:
''
It will be noted that a sumrnary judgment
can be granted only when it is shown that there
is no geniune issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party also is entitled to judgment
as a ffi3.tter of law under those facts.
The court
cannot ronsider the weight of testimony or the
credibility of witnesses
in considering a
motion for sumrnary judgment.
He simply determines
that there is no disputed issue of material fact
and that as a natter of law a party should prevail.
"Page 12 8.
(Emphasis added. 1
The court below held that the homestead of defendant
Leoda Dunham had been conveyed to respondents, and that the
value of the remainder interest so conveyed was less than
the value of eefendant Leoda Dunham's oomestead.

-18-
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Consequently

the interest passed to respondents free of appellant's judgment
lien pursuant to U.C.A.

28-1-2 and defendant Leoda Dunham was

left with an unprotected life estate.

If the court had

held that the conveyed property interest had a value in
excess of the homestead amount, the appellant's judgment would
have attached to that excess.

Thus, the value of the conveyed

interest is a naterial question, which, as explained below, is
in dispute.
At the hearing in the court below, respondents'

counsel

relied on defendant Leoda Dunham's self-serving declaration
of the value of her interest in the subject property, which
was stated in her homestead declaration to be $3,600.00.
Other than defendant Leoda Dunham's homestead delcaration, no
evidence was produced or referred to in the court below which
would show that the value of defendant Leoda Dunham's remainder
interest had a lesser value than her claimed homestead
exemption of $4,600.00.
The statement of the value of the subject property
contained in the homestead declaration is incompetent
evidence as to the true value of the property interest.
Schuler-Knox co., supra.

Thus, the court below had no

competent evidence before it which supports its judgment
that the property interest conveyed by defendant Leoda Dunham
to respondents had a lesser value than her homestead exemption.

-19-
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At the hearing below, appellant's counsel claimed the
interest was worth approximately $15, 000. 00, and referred to
the purchase agreement between respondents and defendant
Leoda Dunham wherein respondents obtained the remainder
interest by agreeing to pay approximately $2 ,000. 00 to obtain
a release of rcortgage against the property and to acquire
appellant's interest in the property.

See Agreement attached

to either respondents' Affidavit which was filed with

responden:s~

Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or For Summary Judgment.
Appellant's interest in defendant Leoda Dunham's property was
a judgment of $11,574.43,

together with interest of $1,388.00

as of the time of the conveyance.

Further,

the conveyance to

respondents took place less than three months after the
home stead declaration of defendant Leoda Dunham was made.

The

fact that respondents offerred to purchase defendant Leoda
Dunham's interest, subject to her life estate, in return for
a promise to acquire appellant's interest in the property
and to pay off the $2, 000. 00 rcortgage,

together with the fact

!

that this consideration of approximately $15,000.00 was
offered only three months after defendant Leoda Dunham claimed
the interest in the property was worth $3,600.00, should
have been sufficient by itself to cause the court below to
question the validity of defendant Leoda Dunham's own claim

-20-
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1

as to the value of her interest in the subject real estate.
This is especially true in that defendant Leoda Dunham
made her homestead declaration only three days before the
subject property was to be sold at sheriff's sale.
In hearings before the District Court, respondents claimed
that the Agreement provided only that respondents would be
obligated to acquire the appellant's undivided one-half interest
in the property.

They argued that the agreement did not require

them to satisfy appellant's judgment.

If they had, they would

have admitted that they were willing to pay off the $2,000. 00
rrortgage and the appellant's judgment in the approximate amount
of $13, 000. 00 to obtain a remainder interest in defendant
Leoda Dunham's lll'ldivided one-half.

Thus they would have admitted

that they paid consideration worth approximately $15,000,00 for
an interest which defendant Leoda Dunham had declared to be
worth no rrore than $3,600.00 only three rronths before.
The terms of the agreement clearly show what was intended.
Paragraph 3 of the Agreement provides that the respondents herein
were to "acquire" appellant's interest in the subject property
so as to give defendant Leoda Dunham "the full use, control,
income and possession" of the property for her life.

See

Agreement attached to either respondents' affidavit which was filed
with respondents' Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or For
Summary Judgment.

The only way that defendant Leoda Dunham

could obtain the full use and control of the subject property,
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assuming respondents'

claim that the homestead was conveyed

to them is correct, was by satisfying appellant's judgment.
If they failed to satisfy the judgment, defendant Leoda
Dunham's life estate would be in continual jeopardy.

Thus,

part of the consideration paid defendant Leoda Dunham must
have been the promise to satisfy appellant's judgment lien,
and, consequently, respondents agreed to provide defendant
Leoda Dunham with a consideration which was greatly in excess
of the claimed value of $3,600.00,
The court below, rather than recognize the dispute over
the value of the subject real estate interest, chose to accept
the value based on defendant Leoda Dunham's homestead

declarati~

The homestead declaration claimed defendant Leoda Dunham's
interest to be worth $J, 600. 00.

The District Court apparently

overlooked the self-serving and incompetent nature of the
homestead declaration.

The homestead declaration was clearly

self-serving in that it was filed two days before the subject
realty was to be sold at sheriff's sale.

The obvious purpose

of filing the declaration was to interfere with the sheriff's
sale of the property.

Within thre.e months of the date the

homestead declaration was filed,

the property was conveyed to

respondents upon the terms of the Agreement referred to above.
Clearly, the value of property set forth in a homestead
declaration, under these circumstances, should not be accepted
as conclusive for purposes of summary proceedings.

-22-
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I'

1

Further,

the value of defendant Leoda Dunham's homestead was

not squarely before the court at the hearing, and was
certainly not established sufficiently in the pleadings for
the court to render a judgment on the pleadings.

The notion

of appellant for Judgment On The Pleadings Or For Summary Judgment
shows that the appellant attempted to convince the court that
the conveyance to respondents with the reservation of a life
estate in defendant Leoda Dunham was an act of reserving the
homestead as well.

Respondents argued that the homestead

had been conveyed to plaintiffs.

Neither party was adequately

prepared to present evidence on the true value of the interest
conveyed to respondents.
Further, the court below was appraised in appellant's
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Reconsider of other evidence
which reflects on the value of the realty in question,
specifically the case of James L. Barker,Jr., Trustee vs.
George R. Dunham and Leoda

s.

Dunham, Third Judicial District

Court of Summit County, State of Utah, Civil No. 3085.
this case,

In

judgment was rendered on September 4th, 1959, against

defendant Leoda Dunham requiring her to account for sales of
certain realty which was a part of the realty involved in thi~
matter.

Defendant Leoda Dunham was to account to the plaintiffs

in that action for one-half the value of all lots sold after

-23-
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November 8th, 1953, and those plaintiffs were to be granted
judgment for that amount.

The records of the County Recorder

of Summit County show that approximately four and one-half
acres of land were conveyed by defendant Leoda Dunham out of
the parcel in question during the period of November 8th,
1953 to September 4th, 1959.

On June 26th, 1962, the Third

Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah,
rendered judgment against defendant Leoda Dunham in the
amount of $4,200. 00, which amount represents one-half the
proceeds of the sale of the approximately four and one-half
acres referred to above.
The realty in question in this suit consists of an undivided one-half interest in approximately thirty five
acres of hillside land,

l35 J

certain unsold lots in Kamp Kill Kare

subdivision, and approximately 6. 5 acres of land which is
I

similar to that for which the accounting was required of de fen·
dant Leoda Dunham.

The value of the 6.5 acres alone should,

consequently, be equal to or greater than the value of the
approximately four and one-half acres for which defendant
Leoda Dunham accounted.

Since one-half of the value of four

and one-half acres from 1953 to 1959 was $4,200.00, the value
of the 6. 5 similar acres certainly must have been greater in
1972 when respondents purchased a one-half interest in the
6.5 acres as well as 35 hillside acres and unsold lots in Kamp
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i

·I

Kill Kare subdivision.

Thus, evidence can be produced and should

be produced relative to the value of the interest conveyed
to respondents by defendant Leoda Dunham in 1972.

This evidence

will show that the true value of the realty interest in question
is greatly in excess of $3,600.00 as claimed by defendant Leoda
Dunham in her homestead declaration.
The principles of law referred to above regarding summary
judgment, as applied to this case, result in the conclusion
that summary judgment on the value of the remainder interest
conveyed to respcndents was improper.

The court below necessarily

had to view t.'1e facts in the most favorable light to appellant.
Dunn, supra.

Also,

it should not have judged the weight of

the evidence, but rather determined whether conflicting evidence
existed.

Singleton, supra.

The agreement, referred to above,

by which respondents agreed to purchase defendant Leoda Dunham's
remainder interest, when viewed in the no st favorable light
for appellants, demonstrates that respondents obligated themselves
to pay approximately $15,000.00 for the properties.
court below should not have

Further, the

judged the credibility of the pur-

chase agreement against that of the homestead declaration which
showed defendant Leoda Dunham's entire interest to be worth

-25-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

only $3,600.00.

Instead,

the lower court should have recognize

the incompetency of the stated value in the homestead declarat 11
and ruled that the determination of the value of the subject

!

property must await trial.

IV
THE FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED
TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN
THE PARTIES 1 PLEADINGS WHICH WERE ADMITTED.
Many of the allegations in the parties'
admitted.

pleadings were

Sl.Ullinary procedures were begun in the case because

of these admissions.

However,

the Findings Of Fact as presente:I

by the respondents and approved by the court did not reflect
many of the admissions.

I

These admissions are material and

present a clear picture of the facts in this case.

Appellant's

motion to amend the Findings Of Fact to include these admission:!
should aa ve been gr anted.

v
FINDING OF FACT NO. 5 SHOULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED
TO AVOID THE REPRESENTATION THAT THE APPELLANT
FILED NOTHING NHICH INDICATED THE VALUE OF THE
LAND IN QUESTION, IN THAT SUCH FINDING OF FACT
IS MISLEADING BECAUSE INSOFAR AS THE VALUE OF
THE IAND WAS DISCUSSED, APPELLANT RELIED ON
THOSE CERTAIN AFFIDAVITS FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS
WHICH SET FORTH THE CONSIDERATION THE RESPONDENTS
WERE WILLING TO PAY TO DEFENDANT LEODA DUNHAM TO
OBTAIN HER INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY OF
THIS IAWSUIT.
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Finding of Fact No.

5 implies that appellant failed

to make the court below aware of any evidence showing a value
different than that claimed by C'efendant Leoda Dunham in her
homestead C'eclaration.

As explained above, appellant relied

on the Agreement submitted by respondents with their affidavit
in support of their Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or
For Surmnary Judgment to show what respondents were willing to
pay for the property.

Consequently, Finding of Fact No.

5

should have been amended to remove the false implication given
therein.

VI
FINDING OF FACT NO. 7 SHOULD BE AMENDED TO
EXPLICITLY STATE THAT DUE TO THE CONVEYANCE BY
DEFENDANT' ;LEODA DUNHAM OF HER HOMESTEAD INTEREST
TO THE RESPONDENTS, SHE RETAINED A BARE LIFE
ESTATE vlHICH WAS SOLD AT THE SHERIFF'S SALE OF
DECEMBER 7th, 1976, WHICH STATEMENT WILL REMOVE
THE AMBIGUITY CAUSED BY REFERENCE TO "EXISTING
INTEREST" FOUND IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF FINDING
NO. 7.
The court below held .that defendant Leoda Dunham
had conveyed her homestead to respondents, and that the value
of the interest conveyed to respondents was less than the
total homestead exemption defendant Leoda Dunham was entitled
to.

Thus, based upon this ruling,

respondents'

and U.C.A. 28-1-2, the

interest in the property could not have been

sold at the sheriff's sale of December 7th,

1976.
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I

Finding of Fact No.

7 states that "the then existing interj

was sold at the sheriff's sale.

The finding does not indicate ,

whose interest is referred

However, in context,

to.

the re- I

ference can only be to the retained life estate of defendant

i

i

Leoda Dunham,

for,

under the lower court's ruling,

this is

only interest that could be sold at the sheriff's sale.

thel

Thus,

the finding should have been amended so as to directly set fort'
the consequence of the court's ruling, i.e., that the unprotected life estate of defendant Leoda Dunham was sold at
the sheriff's sale.

CONCLUSION
The issues herein considered which are of rrost importance
concern t.11.e status of a home stead where a judgment has created
a lien against the property prior to the time that the declara·I
tion of homestead is made and filed.

It is appellant's posi-

tion that a judgment lien existing prior to the date that
a homestead declaration is made is superior to that homestead
and, consequently, a declaration of homestead protects only
against judgment liens obtained during the time that such home·I
stead exists.

It is also appellant's contention, which in this!
•

I

case may be seen to be in the alternative, that the act of a
I

homestead claimant in reserving any interest capable of supportj
a homestead, when the remaining interest of the homestead
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claimant is conveyed away without specifically conveying the
homestead,

is,

claim as wel 1.

as a rna.tter of law, a reservation of the homestead
In any event,

the court below was not justified

in holding in summary proceedings that the value of the property
conveyed to respondents herein was in value less than the total
homestead exemption of defendant Leoda Dunham.
of value is rna.terial and is disputed herein,
facts,

The question

and, based upon such

the question of value should be properly determined

at trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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